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The growth outlook for the developed countries, in Europe in particular, has
deteriorated dramatically in recent weeks. The “voluntary and negotiated” devaluation
of Greek sovereign debt securities, which is really nothing but a sovereign default, the
wave of budget cuts being announced even as the budget bills are still debated, the
inability of the European Union to mobilize its forces in the crisis – all these factors
render the forecasts made two months ago obsolete. For many European countries,
including France, 2012 will be a year of recession.
Published in August 2011, the growth figures for the second quarter of 2011 in the
developed countries put the positive signals from early 2011 into perspective. In the
third quarter of 2011, the national accounts were better than expected, but the respite
was short-lived. The economic indicators for most of the developed countries (see
below) heralded a reduction in activity in the fourth quarter of 2011 and early 2012.
The euro zone will be stagnant in 2012, with GDP growth of 0.4% and Germany recor-
ding the “best” performance in the zone (Table 1).
The first phase of the great recession, in 2008-2009, led to the swelling of public
debt (about 16 points in the euro zone, more than 30 points in the United States and
the United Kingdom, see Table 2). Phase II will be determined by how the public debt
caused by the crisis has been digested: either the low interest rates will make it possible
to postpone the adjustment of public deficits and the economies can bounce back,
thus easing the necessary adjustment, or the adjustment will be immediate, amplified
by higher public rates and the persistence of under-employment (Table 3). Gripped by
the fear of default, Europe is transforming the great recession that began in 2008 into a
very great recession.
After the “voluntary” Greek default, the euro zone countries have inflicted on them-
selves not only an adjustment that was even more brutal than that required by the
Stability and Growth Pact, but also contagion and a general collapse in sovereign debt.
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OFCE Department of Analysis and Forecasting, under the direction of Xavier TimbeauThe measures proposed by the European Union, from the European Financial Stability
Facility (EFSF) to the adoption of the “golden rule”, have not been persuasive of its
ability to solve the public finance problems of the euro zone members either in the
short or long term, especially as Europe seems to have forgotten that growth and the
restoration of full employment are fundamental to the sustainability of public debt and
to the European project more generally.
Faced with the risk of insolvency on sovereign debt, creditors are demanding higher
risk premiums to continue to fund both new debt and the renewal of the fraction of
old debt that is expiring. The hardening of financing conditions, even as business pros-
pects are deteriorating as a result of budget cuts, is nipping the attempts at fiscal
consolidation in the bud. The result: a downward spiral. The rising cost of debt adds to
interest charges, which undercuts deficit reduction and leads to additional fiscal disci-
pline to reassure donors. The added restrictions weigh on activity and wind up
augmenting the cyclical deficits. At which point the governments, panicked at the
stubborn resistance of the deficits and the prospect of a downgrade in their sovereign
rating, respond with even greater rigor.
Because the economies of the European countries are so closely interconnected, the
simultaneous implementation of restrictive fiscal policies leads to magnifying the
global economic slowdown by undercutting foreign trade (we developed this point in
our previous forecasting exercise). Restrictive policies hit domestic demand in
whichever countries implement them and thus reduce their output, but also their
imports. This dynamic decreases the exports of their trading partners, and therefore
their activity, regardless of their own fiscal policies. If these partners also implement a
restrictive policy, then an external impact has to be added to the internal cutbacks
(indirect). The magnitude of these effects depends on several factors. The direct effects
are mainly linked to negative impulses in each country. The indirect effect is more diffi-
cult to measure, since it depends on the degree of openness of each country, the
geographical distribution of its exports and the elasticity of imports to GDP of the
countries that are tightening their policy. Thus, a very open country for which the
majority of exports are going to a country with severe budget cuts will suffer a strong
indirect effect. In this respect, the highly integrated countries of the euro zone will
suffer more from the restrictive policies of their partners than will the United States or
Japan. Their growth will be seriously curtailed, pushing back deficit reduction. In many
countries, the coming recession is the result of the increasingly restrictive measures
being taken to try to stabilize their debt / GDP ratio as soon as possible in an
increasingly unfavourable economic environment. 
The race to tighten up to try to bring public deficits below 3% of GDP and to stabi-
lize debt ratios is aimed as much at meeting the requirements of European agreements
as it is at reassuring the rating agencies and financial markets. The latter, among them
the European banks, in fact, hold at least 50% of the public debt of the developed
countries in the form of securities issued by the national debt agencies. This percen-
tage varies from 77% of the public debt held by financial institutions in France to 97%
for Spain.
In the euro zone, between 9 and 23 percentage points of GDP of public debt,
depending on the country, has to be renewed in 2012 (see Table 2). Outside of Japan,
it is Italy, which combines a high debt with a large proportion of short-dated securities,
that will have the largest financing requirement. If requirements related to the finan-2 briefing paper no. 1 / january 10, 2012
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the euro zone ranges between 10% of GDP in Germany to 24% in Italy.
These high levels are posing problems for countries that have lost the confidence of
the markets. If the interest rates at which these countries are financed in 2012 remain
at their average levels for the last quarter of 2011, Spain would borrow at 5% and Italy
at 4.3%. France and Germany, however, would continue to benefit from low interest
rates (1.5% and 0.9% respectively). The issue rates in December 2011 for these two
countries have been little affected up to now by the threats to downgrade the sove-
reign debt of the euro zone countries. Even though the need for funding from the
markets was greater in 2012 for the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan than
for the euro zone, their rates have remained low. Paradoxically, the downgrading of
the US sovereign rating in August 2011 was accompanied by a decrease in 10 year
rates and short-term rates in the United States. Within this context of a flight to safety,
the programmes of massive purchases of government securities on the secondary
market that were implemented by the Federal Reserve (FED), the Bank of England
(BoE) and the Bank of Japan have been keeping public long-term rates low. Monetary
policy is aimed at affecting short-term interest rates as well as long-term rates. The role
of lender of last resort being adopted by these central banks is thus reassuring the
markets and avoiding higher interest rates during Treasury auctions. In contrast, the
ECB’s mandate and the strict supervision of Europe’s legal scaffolding limit its actions.
The relatively low amounts of government bonds purchased since 2010 (2.3% of euro
zone GDP compared with 11% of US GDP for the Fed and 13% of UK GDP for the BoE)
and tension between euro zone countries concerning the role of the central bank is
fuelling demands by investors to protect their risks by raising premiums.
To stop the collapse of European sovereign debt, we must rule out any possibility of
a sovereign default, public interest rates must be reduced to the maximum by all
means possible, and a European strategy for stabilizing the public debt needs to be
implemented, first by dealing with under-employment so as to renew growth,
followed by the adjustment of public finances.
The fiscal consolidation efforts being undertaken in Europe are inflicting a new
shock on the global economy. Economic indicators have worsened everywhere over
the past six months, putting a brake on activity at the turn of the year, and even
pushing some euro zone countries into recession. The debt crisis in the euro zone has
once again hit the financial system, which could undermine the banks’ lending activity
and reinforce the recessionary impact of the fiscal consolidation programmes. The
expansion in the cyclical component of the deficits that these programmes have gene-
rated is hindering the achievement of the initial budget targets and calling forth yet
more fiscal discipline. If governments stick to their commitments in 2012 no matter
what the cost, the depth of the recession will come close to that of 2008/2009.    briefing paper no. 1 / january 10, 2012 3
OFCE Department of Analysis and Forecasting, under the direction of Xavier TimbeauTable 1. Forecasts for 2012
2011 2012 2011 2012
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4   
GDP 1.3 0.3 0.5 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 3.0 0.4
Germany Unemployment rate 6.1 5.9 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.7
 Public deficit*         -1.2 -1.4
GDP 0.9 -0.1 0.4 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 -0.2
France Unemployment rate 9.2 9.1 9.3 9.6 9.9 10.2 10.5 10.7 9.3 10.3
 Public deficit*         -5.8 -5.3
GDP 0.1 0.3 0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.7 -0.9
Italy Unemployment rate 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.8 8.9 9.0 8.2 8.8
 Public deficit*         -3.9 -2.3
GDP 0.4 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0
Spain Unemployment rate 20.6 21 22.2 22.6 22.8 23 23 23 21.6 23.0
 Public deficit*         -7.4 -5.4
GDP 0.8 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0
Euro zone Unemployment rate 10.0 10.0 10.6 10.8 10.9 11.0 11.1 11.2 10.3 11.1
 Public deficit*         -3.5 -2.9
GDP 0.4 0.1 0.5 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.5
United
Kingdom
Unemployment 
rate 7.7 7.9 8.3 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.8 8.1 8.7
 Public deficit*         -9.1 -8.5
GDP 0.1 0.3 0,6 0,4 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3 1.7 1.4
United
States
Unemployment 
rate 8.9 9.1 9.1 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 9.0 8.7
 Public deficit*         -9.2 -9.2
GDP -0.7 -0.3 1.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 -0.1 2.4
Japan Unemployment rate 4.7 4.6 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.6
 Public deficit*         -8.8 -9.4
* in GDP points.
Sources: National accounts, OFCE forecasts December 2011.4 briefing paper no. 1 / january 10, 2012
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 GER FRA ITA SPA UK USA JPN EZ 4
Financing requirement on the markets in 2012
In billions 255 M€ 295 M€ 391 M€ 175 M€ 257 M£ 3151 M$ 226 tls ¥ 1116 M€
In percentage pts of GDP 9.8 14.1 24.4 15.8 16.5 19.8 47.4 15.1
 Of which public deficit financed by recourse to the market in 2012  
In billions 20 M€ 78 M€ 31 M€ 57 M€ 134 M£ 910 M$ 32 tls ¥ 186 M€
In percentage pts of GDP 0.8 3.7 1.9 5.1 8.6 5.7 6.7 2.5
Of which debt reaching maturity financed by recourse to the market in 2012  
In billions 235 M€ 217 M € 360 M€ 118 M€ 122 M£ 2241 M$ 194 tls ¥ 930 M€
In percentage pts of GDP 9.0 10.4 22.5 10.6 7.8 14.1 40.7 12.6
Total public debt - 2011  
In billions of euros 2 062 1 693 1 884 568 1 381 11 064 9 516 6 207
In billions of dollars 2 795 2 294 2 553 770 1 871 14 994 12 896 8 412
In billions of euros 2010 
PPP 2 051 1 823 1 869 500 1 283 10 210 11 144 6 216
In dollars per capita 34 183 35 258 42 109 16 693 29 972 46 510 101 156 33 171
In percentage pts of GDP 80.3 83.7 118.7 52.4 78.5 98.3 213.4 85.5
Change from 2007 15.4 19.9 15.1 16.3 34.0 33.5 46.3 16.6
Market public debt estimated at 31 December 2011  
In billions of euros 1 108 1 315 1 571 558 1 326 7 297 6 727 4 551
In billions of dollars 1 502 1 782 2 129 756 1 797 9 890 9 116 6 168
In billions of euros 2010 
PPP 1 102 1 416 1 558 490 1 809 9 890 11 568 4 558
In percentage pts of GDP 43.1 65.0 99.0 51.4 75.4 64.8 150.8 62.7
In dollars per capita 18 368 27 385 35 116 16 372 28 786 30 678 71 505 24 322
Characteristics of the market debt
Average interest rate
on the debt in 2011 nd 3.1 nd 4.0 2.2 3.3 1.0 nd
Average interest rate
on issues in 2011 nd nd 3.5 nd 2.8 nd 0.3 nd
Average interest rate
on issues in 2012 0.9 1.5 4.3 5.0 2.0 1.4 0.5 2.9
Interest rate on 10-year 
issues in 2012 2.0 3.2 6.3 5.3 2.3 2.2 1.1 4.3
Note : Purchasing power parities (in French: “PPA”) are calculated relative to the euro zone and take into account price 
differences between euro zone countries.
Sources: OFCE calculations December 2011, Eurostat, National Treasuries.briefing paper no. 1 / january 10, 2012 5
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The publication in August 2011 of the growth figures for the second quarter
dampened the hopes that had been kindled by the brief first-quarter upturn for a
painless recovery from the sovereign debt crisis, particularly in Europe. The turnaround
in the economic indicators during the summer months has reinforced the view that the
economies have reversed course, with mounting concerns that the European econo-
mies are once again sinking into recession (see below). The National Accounts for the
third quarter, though better than what might have been expected from the business
climate, have not alleviated the negative expectations for the end of this year and the
start of next year. The hopes for positive growth in the major European countries over
2012 as a whole have thus vanished, and Germany, with virtually stagnant average
annual growth in GDP (0.4%), will be the top performer in the euro zone (Table 1).
While economic growth in the third quarter of 2011 was more robust in the United
States, the United Kingdom and Japan than was predicted in our October forecast, in
the euro zone it was in line with our forecasts (Figure 1). The slowdown in growth,
0.2% for the spring quarter, has continued throughout the zone. This general stagna-
tion nevertheless conceals major differences in national performance, which might be
related in part to the adverse effects of the disruptions in Japanese production last
spring in the automotive and electronics industries following the Fukushima disaster. In
Germany and to a lesser extent in France, growth has definitely been better (0.5% and
0.4%, as against the October forecast of 0.3% and 0.2%), in particular because of a
stronger rebound in household consumption (0.8% in Germany and 0.3% in France)
from the contraction in spring, along with a pick-up in exports. In contrast, the smaller
and more open countries have experienced a more marked slowdown in GDP growth,
or even a decline. This was true in particular for Spain (where the revised accounts indi-
cate that domestic demand worsened through the first half of 2011, and was still
deteriorating in the third quarter), Belgium and the Netherlands.
In the fourth quarter of 2011, this divergence in growth rates in Europe should fade
away as the surveys and cyclical indicators deteriorate in all the countries. The heighte-
ning tensions in the euro zone financial markets and the announcement of new fiscal
adjustment plans are increasingly stamping their mark on the outlook for production.
All the forecasts are being revised downwards in the fourth quarter, and the euro zone
will experience a decline in GDP of -0.1%, in contrast to the 0.2% growth originally
forecast. In Germany and France, the economy will shrink in the quarter by -0.1% and
-0.2%, respectively (versus the initial forecast of growth of 0.3% and 0.2%). In
Germany, domestic orders and export orders from industry fell in the third quarter,
Table 3. Changes in the state of the unemployed between 2007 and 2010
In points of the working population
Change between 2007 and 2010 Germany Spain France Italy UK
Unemployment -1.6 11.9 1.3 2.4 2.6
Long-term unemployment -1.5 5.7 0.5 1.2 1.3
Unemployment not covered by benefits -0.3 5.7 0.5 2.0 4.3
Source: Eurostat.6 briefing paper no. 1 / january 10, 2012
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but will still remain positive. In France, surveys of industry have become much gloo-
mier during the summer, and the utilization rate of production capacity, which
recovered strongly from mid-2009 to mid-2011, plunged once again in the third and
fourth quarters of 2011. According to the October 2011 survey, company heads have
cut their forecast for investment in industry for 2011 and expect a sharp slowdown in
2012. More importantly, financing conditions are tightening. Since business margins
and cash flow levels are at very low levels, in France in particular, financial constraints
are weighing heavily on investment decisions, which have already been affected by the
lack of visibility and the resurgence of the risk of recession.
In the United Kingdom, third-quarter growth was better than expected (0.5%, up
from the 0.2% forecast in October), but the improvement is deceptive. The state of
private demand has deteriorated, household consumption has continued to stagnate,
the decline in business investment has become more pronounced, and exports have
fallen instead of rising. Caught by surprise, companies have massively re-stocked,
which generally propped up growth (contributing 0.7 point). But by year end activity
will no longer benefit from this phenomenon, and growth will turn negative. This is
already being reflected in the net deterioration in surveys of industry (total order
books, including for exports; the 6-month production outlook; etc.), and consumer
confidence indicators have stabilized at very low levels.
In the United States, growth, which was revised upwards in the first half year, was
still accelerating in the third quarter, reflecting a good performance both by household
consumption (up 0.6% from the 0.2% forecast) and by business investment (3.5%
versus 1% predicted). Surveys of households and firms, which had worsened earlier
this year, reflect a rather morose state of affairs, without, however, indicating the start
of a recession. Fourth-quarter growth is still expected to be 0.4%, as economic agents
continue to enjoy tax breaks until year end.
In Japan, the 2011 recession was slightly less deep than had been indicated in earlier
versions of the national accounts, and the recovery that began last autumn has picked
up speed faster than expected (1.5% versus 0.9%). Once again it is private domestic
demand that is driving growth, with public spending still way down.
This update of the available information thus leads us to begin the year 2012 with a
downward revision of between -0.1 and -0.2 point of the expected “carry-over growth
rate” [acquis de croissance1] for the four major euro zone countries and an upward revi-
sion of between 0.1 and 0.3 point for the United States, Japan and the United
Kingdom.  
1. The acquis de croissance or “carry-over growth” refers to the growth rate for the year assuming that there is
no change in subsequent growth during the year from that in the most recent quarter known.briefing paper no. 1 / january 10, 2012 7
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for the main euro zone countries
         Index, 2010 Q4 =100
Bold line: actual GDP until Q3 2011 and OFCE forecast since December 2011.
Thin line: actual GDP until Q2 2011 and OFCE forecast of October 2011.
Sources: Eurostat, OFCE forecasts.
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The very great recession: Economic outlook updated in 2012New warning on credit
The debt crisis of the euro zone countries is striking a financial system that still bears
the scars of the previous crisis. The rise in government bond yields is leading to losses
on the debt securities portfolios of Europe’s banks, which is undermining their liquidity
and solvency. While the central banks2 have shown their resolve to act in a coordinated
manner to prevent systemic collapse, the increased fragility of the financial system
could still hurt lending and reinforce the already highly recessionary impact of the fiscal
consolidation programmes.
While tensions on the interbank markets began to resurface everywhere this
summer, they are more intense in the euro zone, where in mid-December the gap
between rates for secured loans and those for unsecured loans reached 1.75 for inter-
bank loans with a 1-year maturity and 1.2 points for those with a 3-month maturity
(Figure 3). This indicator reflects how difficult it is for banks in the euro zone to regain
confidence and thus ensure their refinancing. The deposits of the euro zone’s financial
institutions are contributing less and less to the financing of their liabilities. Despite the
interventions of the ECB, the share of these deposits fell from 20.6% in late 2007 to
18.2% in October 2011. In addition, at the conclusion of the October 23rd European
summit in Brussels, the 27 member countries of the EU agreed on the principle of an
increase in the capital held by the private banks in order to guard against the declining
value of certain bonds. According to the European Banking Authority, to achieve a Tier
One ratio of 9% by June 2012 Europe’s banks need to be recapitalized by 106 billion
euros: 8.8 billion in France, 5.2 billion in Germany, 7.8 billion in Portugal, 26 billion in
Spain, 14.7 billion in Italy and 30 billion in Greece. However, in a context of financial
stagnation, banks will find it difficult to raise new funds and would then have no choice
but to sell risky assets and reduce their lending. Indeed, as European banks hold a large
amount of euro zone sovereign debt, they are being forced to offload weakened public
assets in order to prevent a decline in their prudential ratio. This pro-cyclical mecha-
nism is pushing up rates in countries in trouble, accelerating the loss of investor
confidence. Banks that cash in their losses on assets that are declining in value and are
then finding it difficult to recapitalize on the markets are driven to reduce the size of
their balance sheets by restricting bank lending.3
Aware of this risk of a credit crunch, the ECB decided on a further cut in its key inte-
rest rates at its meeting in December 2011, and thus reversed both of the untimely
increases of the first half of 2011. It also announced new non-standard measures aimed
at improving liquidity and securing bank refinancing over the long term. Indeed, anti-
cipating major funding requirements, the ECB will carry out two refinancing operations
with a maturity of three years. In addition, the criteria for collateral eligibility were
expanded and the reserve ratio requirement lowered. While these measures are essen-
tial to avoid intensifying the crisis, it is not certain that they will be sufficient to reverse
the tightening of credit. In the fourth quarter survey, the banks declare that they are
2. On 30 November 2011, six central banks (Bank of England, Bank of Japan, European Central Bank, US
Federal Reserve Bank, National Bank of Switzerland and Bank of Canada) announced a concerted effort to provide
liquidity to the banks. The agreement provides in particular for the reactivation of dollar swaps to meet the dollar
liquidity needs of the banks.
3. This notion, characterized as a bank capital channel, was developed initially by Peek & E. Rosengren (1995):
“The capital crunch: Neither a borrower nor a lender be”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol.27, no. 3, pp.
625-638.briefing paper no. 1 / january 10, 2012 9
OFCE Department of Analysis and Forecasting, under the direction of Xavier Timbeauactually putting tougher conditions on lending to households – especially for
mortgages – and businesses (Figure 4) because of the outlook for the sector but also
due to the cost and difficulty of access to refinancing. Although this is on a smaller
scale than what was seen in late 2008, the tightening of loan terms will block credit
and ultimately growth.4 Thus, the euro zone will see the continuation of a lower level
of grants of new loans to households, a factor since mid-2007, and to businesses, a
factor since mid-2008. The impact of this crisis on fourth-quarter macroeconomic
performance is probably already being felt in the periodic surveys and leading indica-
tors. For 2012, the decrease in activity associated with this second phase of the credit
crunch should be about 0.1 to 0.2 percentage point of growth in the euro zone.  
4. G. de Bondt, A. Maddaloni, J-L. Peydro & S. Scopel (2010) showed that surveys of the distribution of credit in
the euro zone have a predictive power on the evolution of credit and growth, with tighter credit conditions
causing a decline in credit and activity. See “The euro area bank lending survey matters: Empirical evidence for
credit and growth”, ECB Working Paper No. 1160. These findings confirm in particular the similar results found
for the United States.
Graph 3. Tensions on the interbank market
       In %
Note : The Euribor rate corresponds to unsecured interbank loans whereas the Eurepo is the rate for interbank loans 
that are secured by collateral.
Source: Datastream.
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The very great recession: Economic outlook updated in 2012The machine infernale of public deficit reduction: 
Europe on trial
All the European governments, which are committed under the Stability programme
to an ambitious programme of public deficit reduction, are facing a deteriorating
cyclical component in their public balances. The growth forecasts for 2012 used by
governments as the framework for their budget bills have quickly become outdated,
exposing fiscal austerity plans that are under-calibrated to achieve their public deficit
targets. Most governments have chosen to revise their growth forecasts downward and
announce a new round of fiscal tightening to meet their commitments. The French
case is a good example of this strategy. By revising its growth forecast for 2012 from
1.75% to 1%, the government has anticipated a shortfall of 7 billion euros in tax
revenue and social contributions.5 To compensate for this cyclical loss, the government
has also announced a new plan for fiscal savings of 7 billion euros in 2012. This
approach thus assumes that the new plan will not affect growth, and so the forecast of
1% growth in GDP has not been further revised downward to reflect the tightening
austerity. This hypothesis of a fiscal multiplier equal to 0 is far from the current empi-
rical evaluations.6 With a fiscal multiplier of 1 in the short term, the austerity measures
announced should actually result in a fall in GDP of 0.35 point, cutting growth to under
Graph 4. Credit conditions in the euro zone
      Balance
Note: Balance between banks that declare that their conditions are tighter and those that declare their conditions are 
looser.
Source: ECB (Bank lending survey).
5. As 1 percentage point of GDP represents 20 billion euros, a revision of 0.75 point of GDP corresponds to a
loss of 15 billion euros in activity in 2012. As compulsory levies represent 43.7% of GDP, this revision reduces tax
revenue by almost 7 billion euros. 
6. For more information, see “La multiplication de la rigueur”, Revue de l’OFCE, no. 119, October 2011.
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OFCE Department of Analysis and Forecasting, under the direction of Xavier Timbeau0.7%. Due to the lower economic growth, the public deficit will fall by only 0.17 GDP
point. To reduce the ex post deficit by 0.35 point, as envisaged by the government, the
fiscal savings would need to amount to 14 billion euros, which, through the action of
the fiscal multiplier, would reduce the growth forecast for 2012 to 0.3%.
With the exception of Germany and the United Kingdom, between October and
December 2011all the major industrialized countries intensified the structural fiscal
efforts they had planned for 2012. This was particularly true of the United States,
where the fiscal stimulus programmed for October of 0.9 GDP point is now estimated
at -1.1 GDP points, due to the failure to approve the 447 billion dollar American Jobs
Act announced by Obama in September. US fiscal policy is, however, still less restrictive
than that of the euro zone (Figure 5). In Italy, the appointment of the Monti govern-
ment was accompanied by the enactment of a new austerity programme that
increased the country’s fiscal effort by one GDP point (the fiscal stimulus for 2012 is
now estimated at -2.6 GDP points). In Spain and France, an additional 0.35 GDP point
was added to the fiscal consolidation programme, resulting in a fiscal stimulus in 2012
of -2.9 GDP points in Spain and -1.4 GDP points in France. For the United Kingdom,
the fiscal stimulus remains unchanged at -1.9 GDP points, while Germany has slightly
relaxed its fiscal policy, with the stimulus now at -0.2 GDP point. Although Japan has
reduced its fiscal stimulus package by 0.1 GDP point, it is still quite positive for 2012
(at 1.3 GDP points).
This underestimation of the impact of fiscal policy on official growth will lead either
to new rounds of fiscal tightening, accelerating the current recessionary dynamics, or
to higher than expected public deficits. The race to cut public deficits, regardless of the
cyclical impact, is hindering growth and undercutting the sustainability of the public
finances. Underestimating the value of the fiscal multiplier has two consequences: first,
the various countries, by minimizing the impact of fiscal policy on the cyclical compo-
nent of their public accounts, will not achieve their public deficit reduction targets
enshrined in the stability programmes, which will further fuel the markets’ distrust of
the States' ability to repay their debts. Second, by affecting growth more severely than
the governments expect, these policies could lead many euro zone countries into
recession, which would also further heighten market fears about the sustainability of
the public finances.
In the face of this machine infernale, only countries that are clearly protected from
the risk of default by a credible lender of last resort (the role assigned to the central
banks of the United States, United Kingdom and Japan) can afford to refrain from this
escalating series of austerity measures without fear of the impact of a downgrade in
their sovereign debt rating. The euro zone countries, on the other hand, would be hit
immediately by higher refinancing costs if their debt rating were downgraded, and
thus have no choice but to respond to the market by more austerity to achieve their
public deficit targets. The least indebted countries that have less restrictive fiscal poli-
cies, like Germany in particular, would not be spared by the general slowdown in
activity that would result from the austerity programmes of their major trading
partners. Given the high level of commercial integration in the euro zone, the countries
that depend most heavily on intra-European trade will suffer the full force of the
sudden downturn in demand for exports due to the compression of demand within
each country. Faced with this dynamic, the rating agencies have become concerned
about the risk of recession and its potential impact on the financial system. The conta-12 briefing paper no. 1 / january 10, 2012
The very great recession: Economic outlook updated in 2012gion is spreading, and the major euro zone countries are now in the sights of the
financial markets and speculators. The decisions taken by the European Summit of 9
December 2011 to strengthen fiscal discipline including through the adoption of fiscal
rules that are binding on the euro zone States, will not calm the financial markets.
Without as a counterpart an absolute guarantee on public debts from the European
Central Bank, this fiscal constraint cannot ensure the survival of the euro. Indeed,
simply strengthening fiscal austerity will only accelerate the crisis and ultimately
increase the risk that the single currency becomes extinct.
Without this assurance of a lender of last resort, the euro zone governments face no-
win budget choices: either they decide to impose much greater discipline to meet their
budgetary commitments (see section below), which would lead automatically to plun-
ging the euro zone into a deep recession that could lead to a system-wide crisis. Or
they renounce new austerity plans in order to prevent the zone from sinking into reces-
sion, in which case they would be exposed to the thunder of the financial markets.
Only a re-consideration at the European level of current budgetary strategy, in order to
ensure that the medium-term adjustment of public finances is economically and
socially sustainable, would make it possible to begin emerging from the crisis. A stra-
tegy of restoring growth becomes possible only if the ECB announces clearly that it will
act as a lender of last resort in the euro zone so as to avoid speculation on sovereign
debt and stop the contagion.
This overall picture leads us to significantly revise the forecasts we made two
months ago for the outlook for growth in 2012. This revision can be broken down into
four main factors (Table 4):
Graph 5. Revisions (between October and December 2011) 
of fiscal stimulus packages for 2012 
       In percentage points of GDP
Source: OFCE calculations.
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OFCE Department of Analysis and Forecasting, under the direction of Xavier Timbeau1. Lower “carry-over growth” [acquis de croissance] in the euro zone: as mentioned
in the previous section, the end of 2011 will be different than what was anticipated last
October. While this difference does not change the average annual growth rate of GDP
for 2011, it does however have an impact on the carry-over growth expected for 2012.
Growth will be lower for the euro zone countries than was envisaged in October (-0.2
point on average for the zone), while it will be about 0.2 percentage point higher for
the other major countries outside the euro zone.
2. The implementation of new austerity plans: the new measures will directly cut
Italian growth by 0.8 percentage point of GDP in 2012. In Spain and France, the
measures are smaller in scale but will still cut growth by 0.3 GDP point. Finally, the
United States will undergo a radical change of course in fiscal policy, with an impact on
its growth of more than 1 point.
3. The emergence of tighter credit conditions for households and business: this will
constrain internal growth.
4. A less dynamic external environment: these revisions of the forcasted growth in
each country naturally reverberate on the external environment, which will in turn
undercut business by lowering the growth of exports. For the big European countries,
the decline in the activity of their trading partners will cut their own growth by 0.3 to
0.4 GDP point. The United States and Japan, which are less exposed to the slowdown of
the countries studied, will see their growth cut by respectively 0.1 and 0.2 GDP point.
Finally, growth in the euro zone countries was revised significantly (Table 4): the
growth rate was lowered by 0.9 percentage point for the zone as a whole. At the
national level, the revision ranges from -0.8 point for Germany to -1.3 points for Italy.
For the other major countries outside the euro zone, the revision is smaller, at -0.3
point for the United Kingdom and -0.6 point for the United States.
The slowdown in activity, which will be stronger than anticipated by the various
governments, will widen the cyclical component of the public balance and prevent the
Table 4. Annual growth rate of GDP in 2012 as forecast in…
In points of GDP
 GER FRA ITA SPA UK USA JPN
… In October 2011 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.9 0.8 2.0 2.9
… In December 2011 0.4 -0.2 -0.9 0.0 0.5 1.4 2.4
Revision of GDP for 2012 -0.8 -1.0 -1.3 -0.9 -0.3 -0.6 -0.5
due to …  
   … “carry-over growth” -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1
   … effective fiscal stimulus* 0.1 -0.3 -0.8 -0.3 0.0 -1.3 -0.1
   … internal factors -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.5 -0.3
   … the external environment -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2
* Impact of budget and fiscal policy on growth (Fiscal stimulus x Multiplier).
Sources: National sources, OFCE forecasts.14 briefing paper no. 1 / january 10, 2012
The very great recession: Economic outlook updated in 2012developed countries from honouring their respective commitments to deficit
reduction.
This will be the case, according to our forecasts, in particular for the Spanish and
especially the British, who could face a gap between their actual public deficit and their
commitment of between 1 and 2 points of GDP. In the case of France and Italy, the
gap will be 0.8 point. Only Germany will come very close to its commitment (Table 5).
We simulated a scenario in which the governments would, whatever the cost, and
whatever the circumstances, plough ahead and meet their budgetary commitments. If
this were to happen, it would require the adoption of new budget cut plans in the
months to come.
Several possible scenarios were studied. Before going into them in detail, we should
note that we have used the assumption of an internal fiscal multiplier of 0.9, corres-
ponding to a total multiplier of 1.3 by incorporating the feedback effects on foreign
trade. Indeed, as we have detailed in a recent work (OFCE, 20117), in a context
marked by a cyclical downturn and little manoeuvring room for monetary policy, the
simultaneous implementation of austerity programmes in all the European countries
contributes to the formation of a multiplier that is greater than one.
In order to isolate the impact on growth of the national savings plan and those of
the partners, we assumed that each country alone would respect its commitment
(Table 6). Under this assumption, the effort would be considerable in the United
Kingdom, which would present a new fiscal austerity plan of 3.7 GDP points
(65.2 billion euros). France, Italy and Spain would implement a plan that was two
times smaller, between 1.5 GDP points (31 billion for France) and 1.9 points. Finally,
the German savings plan would be the smallest, at 0.3 GDP point (7 billion euros).
These different national austerity plans, each taken alone, would have a non-negli-
gible impact on the growth of the countries studied. With the exception of Germany,
which would still avoid recession, such a strategy would again see the economies
plunge in 2012, with a decline in GDP ranging from -1.6% in France to -2.9% for
Britain. Spain’s economy would shrink by -1.7% and Italy’s by -2.3% (Table 6).
Table 5. Public deficit in 2012 as forecast in…
In percentage points of GDP
GER FRA ITA SPA UK USA JPN
… OFCE  -1.4 -5.3 -2.3 -5.4 -8.5 -9.2 -9.4
… Governments -1.3 -4.5 -1.5 -4.4 -6.5
Gap 0.1 0.8 0.8 1.0 2.0
Sources: national sources, OFCE forecasts.
7. “La multiplication de la rigueur”, Revue de l’OFCE, no. 119, October 2011.briefing paper no. 1 / january 10, 2012 15
OFCE Department of Analysis and Forecasting, under the direction of Xavier TimbeauOf course, if all the major European countries were to adopt the same strategy at
the same time, the savings effort would be greater. It would amount to nearly 72
billion euros in the United Kingdom and 44.6 billion euros in France, representing
respectively 4.1 and 2.2 percentage points of GDP. This additional effort would come
to 2.2 GDP points for Italy (34.9 billion euros), 2.6 GDP points for Spain (28.2 billion)
and 1 GDP point for Germany (26 billion euros). In all, for the five countries studied,
the cumulative savings effort would total more than 200 billion euros in 2012.
This would deliver a powerful shock to activity in these countries: it would cause a
severe recession in some countries in 2012, with a fall in GDP of 3.7% in Italy and the
United Kingdom (as against -5.1% and -4.9% respectively in 2009). The decline in
GDP would be similar in France (-3.0%) and Spain (-3.2%). Under this assumption,
Germany would also tip over into recession (-1.4%).
Table 6. Impact on GDP of meeting the deficit reduction commitments in 2012
In %
GER FRA ITA SPA UK USA JPN 
OFCE forecasts
GDP 0.4 -0.2 -0.9 0.0 0.5 1.4 2.4
Public deficit (in pt of GDP) -1.4 -5.3 -2.3 -5.4 -8.5 -9.2 -9.4
If each country alone meets its commitment
Amount needed
In billions of dollars 7.0 30.8 23.8 20.3 65.2
In points of GDP 0.3 1.5 1.5 1.9 3.7
Impact on…
… GDP 0.0 -1.6 -2.3 -1.7 -2.9
… the public deficit (in GDP points) -1.3 -4.5 -1.5 -4.4 -6.5
If all the European Union countries meet their commitments
Amount needed
In billions of dollars 26.0 44.6 34.9 28.2 71.8
In points of GDP 1.0 2.2 2.2 2.6 4.1
Impact on…
… GDP -1.4 -3.0 -3.7 -3.2 -3.7 1.1 2.1
… the public deficit (in GDP points) -1.3 -4.5 -1.5 -4.4 -6.5 -9.3 -9.5
If all the euro zone countries meet their commitments
Amount needed
In billions of dollars 17.1 38.5 30.1 24.9
In points of GDP 0.7 1.9 1.9 2.3
Impact on…
… GDP -0.7 -2.4 -3.1 -2.6 0.1 1.3 2.2
… the public deficit (in GDP points) -1.3 -4.5 -1.5 -4.4 -8.7 -9.3 -9.5
Source: OFCE forecasts and calculations.16 briefing paper no. 1 / january 10, 2012
The very great recession: Economic outlook updated in 2012ANNEX
SCHEDULE FOR PUBLIC DEBT IN 2012
The total financing requirement of the various States in 2012 is composed of 1) past
debt that is reaching maturity in 2012, which must be refinanced, 2) new funding
requirements generated by public deficits. We sought to estimate the requirements for
the four major countries in the euro zone (Germany, France, Italy, Spain), as well as for
the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom, for comparison (Figure A1).
Graphe A1. Composition of total financing requirements in 2012
      In billions of euros    
Notes : all the amounts were converted into euros. The euro 4 group consists of Germany, France, Italy and Spain.
Source: OFCE forecasts and calculations.
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OFCE Department of Analysis and Forecasting, under the direction of Xavier TimbeauThe new funding requirements, financed by recourse to the market, are calculated
from our forecasts of the public deficits for 2012. The latter is corrected by the share of
market debt in the total public debt (Figure A2), since part of the deficit can be
financed by means other than calling on the market, such as bank financing.
The public debt
For the European countries, the total debt used is debt within the meaning of Maas-
tricht, as estimated at end 2011. Public debt is understood in a broad sense: it includes
short-term securities (with a maturity of less than one year). For Germany, it covers
only the federal debt, and does not include the debt of the Länder. For Japan, it does
not include debt issued by local governments or government agencies.8
Securities reaching maturity in 2012
The timelines of securities maturing in 2012 were constructed from existing infor-
mation about the characteristics of public debt in late 2011, and from assumptions
about the term structure of total refinancing needs in 2012. These are broken down
into two parts:
- Securities issued before end November 2011 and maturing in 2012.
- Short-term securities requiring refinancing sometime in 2012.
- There is also the structure of financing requirements in 2012.
Graphe A2. Market debt as a share of total debt
       In % 
Source: OFCE calculations.
8. Japanese market debt has been reconstructed from the published results of issues of T-bills and JGBs since
1999. It does not take into account the issuance of 20-year securities that took place before that date, nor reissues
through “auctions for enhanced liquidity” or securities withdrawn from the market through “buy-back”
operations. Likewise, Italy’s market debt does not include “buy-back” operations.
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The very great recession: Economic outlook updated in 2012The hypothesis is made that the debt maturing in 2012 and the new funding requi-
rements would be financed by calling on the market based on a distribution key
specific to each country and based on its debt management policy (Figure A3). This
assumption proved necessary, in that the details of security issues have not been
announced for all of 2012. The distribution key used was generally calculated from the
structure of issues in 2011.9 Spain and the United Kingdom have issue policies that are
longer term than the other countries. The issues conducted in 2011 by Spain were for
longer terms than in previous years, the ultimate goal being an extension of the
average maturity of the debt.
The distribution keys take into account the faster pace of issue of securities with a
maturity of less than a year. For example, the share of securities with a 3-month matu-
rity is calculated taking into account that the total of outstanding securities with a 3-
month maturity is renewed four times a year.10
The total funding requirement was reconstituted monthly (Figures A4 and A5).
Despite this, it should not be interpreted strictly speaking as a flow of securities being
issued every month, since the flow of issues depends on the cash flow management of
each State and on market conditions (which can induce the State to advance or post-
pone some issues from one month to another), and because the seasonality observed
for the total refinancing requirement in most countries is inherited from the timing of
past issues.  
9. With the exception of Italy, for which it was calculated over the period October 2009 to September 2011.
Graphe A3. Breakdown by maturity of total financing requirements in 2012
   In %
Source: OFCE forecasts and calculations.
10. The total monthly need for financing in securities maturing in 3 months was thus divided by 4 during the
calculation of the distribution key.
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OFCE Department of Analysis and Forecasting, under the direction of Xavier TimbeauGraphe A4. Total monthly funding requirement in the euro zone
      In billions of euros 
Source: OFCE forecasts and calculations.
Graphe A5. Total monthly funding requirement
      In billions of euros 
Source: OFCE forecasts and calculations.
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The very great recession: Economic outlook updated in 2012By way of comparison, a BNP study published in Les Echos newspaper breaks down
the total issues of securities planned for 2012 into the outstanding amounts reaching
maturity and into those being financed through the market (the deficit share financed
by recourse to the market). The BNP calculations of the amount of securities reaching
maturity are lower: they do not include very short-term securities, which are used by
the State as a tool for cash flow management. We have chosen to take into account the
very short-term securities outstanding, as they have an immediate impact on the debt
burden in case of large variations in interest rates.
The average maturity of the debt
Given the distribution key for each country and the average maturity of the debt at
end 2011, we calculated changes in the average maturity of the debt. This depends on
the stock of existing debt, whose average maturity declines over time, and on the
average maturity of the securities issues to come (Table A2). The average maturity of
the debt will decline in 2012 in most of the countries studied. It will increase slightly in
the United States and Spain, as both countries are implementing a policy of lengthe-
ning the average maturity of the debt by issuing on a longer-term basis than in the
other countries. In the United Kingdom, despite a policy favouring very long maturi-
ties, the average maturity of the debt is decreasing, as new debt issues are only
partially offsetting the decline in the average maturity of the outstanding debt stock.  
Table A1. Comparison of issued volumes in 2012
In billions of euros 
Total bonds reaching maturity OFCE BNP
France 217 99
Germany 235 157
Italy 360 194
Spain 118 47
Net call on market OFCE BNP
France 78 82
Germany 20 28
Italy 31 26
Spain 57 52
Total issues OFCE BNP
France 295 179
Germany 255 185
Italy 391 220
Spain 175 99
Sources: « Les États de la zone euro émettront plus de 800 milliards d’euros de dette l’an prochain », Les Echos (30/11/
2011) ; OFCE forecasts and calculations.briefing paper no. 1 / january 10, 2012 21
OFCE Department of Analysis and Forecasting, under the direction of Xavier TimbeauThe average interest rates on the issues
The sovereign debt crisis in the euro zone has resulted in changes in interest rates –
a decline in long-term rates in Germany, rising spreads between German long-term
rates and the long-term rates in other countries – which, if continued in 2012, will
result in a change in the average cost of refinancing for the States. Where possible, we
calculated the average rates of the issues in 2011, and based on the respective distribu-
tion key and on hypotheses about the term structure of interest rates, an average rate
expected for issues in 2012.
Table A2. Average maturity of issues in 2012
In years
Average maturity in years
Germany 5.0
France 5.2
Italy 3.5
Spain 10.6
United Kingdom 14.5
United States 8.5
Japan 5.3
Source: OFCE forecasts and calculations.
Graphe A6. Average maturity of the stock of negotiable government debt
      In years
Source: OFCE forecasts and calculations.
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The very great recession: Economic outlook updated in 2012The average rates calculated for the issues in 2011 are the average yields weighted
per issue.11 The interest rates selected for 2012 (Figure A7) are those observed in
October 2011 (Italy), at end November 2011 (Japan, United Kingdom, United States),
at beginning December 2011 (France), and for the latest issues (Spain, Germany).  
11. Therefore, they reflect the coupons paid but also the difference between the face value of the security and
the average auction price. They do not correspond to the stated interest rate on the debt.
Graphe A7. Term structure of interest rates
     In %
Sources: Datastream, DataInsight, OFCE forecasts and calculations.
Table A3. Average rates for issues in 2011-2012
In %
Average yield at issue
 2011 2012
Germany na 0.9
France na 1.5
Italy 3.5 4.3
Spain na 5.0
United Kingdom 2.8 2.0
United States na 1.4
Japan 0.3 0.5
Source: OFCE forecasts and calculations.
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